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Abstract
Liu, Yaoqing. M.S.. The University of Memphis. December 2011. Understanding
Multiple Origin AS Conflicts. Major Professor: Dr. Lan Wang.
Internet routing problems are often difficult to detect and diagnose because one
address prefix can be originated by multiple ASes. There is, however, no comprehen-
sive analysis on the causes of Multiple Origin AS (MOAS) conflicts. In this paper,
we study the characteristics of MOAS conflicts and compare them with those from
10 years ago. We also provide an in-depth examination of four MOAS causes –
IXP, anycast, false origin AS, and origin-AS transition. Furthermore, we propose
two heuristics to identify MOAS conflicts caused by false origin ASes and origin-AS
transitions. The findings from our study and proposed heuristics can help us design
effective mechanisms to distinguish legitimate MOAS conflicts from illegitimate ones,
thus improving the reliability and security of Internet routing.
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1 Introduction
Internet routing problems are often difficult to detect and diagnose. One of the
difficulties lies in the fact that one address prefix may be legitimately originated by
multiple Autonomous Systems (ASes), i.e., the prefix may be involved in a legitimate
MOAS (Multiple Origin AS) conflict [20]. Multi-homing, anycast and other common
practices can lead to such legitimate MOAS conflicts. However, mis-configurations
and attacks can also cause MOAS conflicts, which may lead to black-holes and traffic
hijacking. Unfortunately, BGP has no built-in mechanisms to distinguish illegitimate
MOAS conflicts from legitimate ones. In order to improve the reliability and security
of Internet routing, we must first have a thorough understanding of the characteristics
of different MOAS conflicts.
To this end, we conducted a comprehensive study of MOAS conflicts using four
years of BGP data from Jan. 1, 2007 to Dec. 31, 2010. This data was collected from
193 distinct peer routers in 91 ASes by six Routeviews [12] collectors located in North
America, Asia, Europe, and Africa. First, we obtained various statistics on MOAS
prefixes from the data. We then compared these statistics with those from Zhao et al.’s
study conducted ten years ago [20]. Moreover, we examined MOAS conflicts caused by
Internet exchange points and anycast using the BGP data, Internet Exchange Point
(IXP) address prefixes from PCH [13] and inferred anycast DNS addresses from Yu
et al. [19]. Furthermore, we used two heuristics to identify MOAS conflicts caused
by false origin ASes and origin-AS transitions. Finally, after identifying each type of
MOAS conflicts from our data, we studied their characteristics such as the conflict
duration and number of origins involved in the conflicts.
We have the following major findings: (1) there are more MOAS events occurring
on a daily basis today compared to 10 years ago; (2) origin-AS transition is a major
contributor to the large spikes in the observed MOAS conflicts; (3) IXP and anycast
are unlikely to be major causes of the observed MOAS conflicts; and (5) 39.9% of
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the one-day MOAS conflicts were caused by the false origin ASes identified using our
proposed heuristic.
2 Background
An Autonomous System is a set of routers that share a single routing policy, and it
is generally controlled by an Internet Service Provider (ISP). It uniquely identifies
the network of the Internet, but the network does not have to be located at the same
physical area. To the outside world, it is viewed as a single entity and each has an
identity number assigned by Internet Registry. The number is called ASN number
or AS number. Before 2008, the AS number was represented by 16-bit integers from
0-65535, and AS numbers 64512 through 65534 are used for private purposes or we
call them private AS numbers. For example, the University of Memphis was assigned
AS14048 as the AS number. Due to the increasing scale of the Internet, the 32-
bit AS numbers were introduced. The AS23456 was allocated as transit AS for the
handshake of 16-bit AS routers and 32-bit AS routers.
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a path vector protocol used to carry routing
information between two different ASes. The owner of each AS also have a set of
Internet Protocol Prefix (IP prefix or prefix for short) assigned by the Internet Routing
Registry (IRR). BGP uses a list of prefixes to announce reachability for each AS. In
this scenario, the AS was called the origin of the prefixes. For example, the University
of Memphis announces the prefix 141.225/16 with its own AS number AS14048 to the
Internet, then we call AS14048 the origin of prefix 141.225/16 or AS14048 originates
prefix 141.225/16. Note that the origin of one prefix derives from the BGP attribute-
AS path and it may not be the real origin of the prefix, in other words, only if
the origin runs BGP protocol with other ASes may we obtain the real origin of one
prefix. However, in practice BGP is not running over every AS, and this fact leads to
2
Figure 1: Valid MOAS scenario
inconsistent origin AS. One of the inconsistencies is the Multiple Origin AS Conflicts
(MOAS), in which one prefix was announced by more than one AS, although RFC
1930 [4] recommends that one prefix should be originated from one AS. For example,
as seen in Figure 1, the University of Memphis (UM) has two ISPs, ATT with AS7018
and Bell South with AS16473, and they announce the UM prefix 141.225/16 to NTT
America with BGP announcement, there are no BGP sessions between UM and the
two ISPs. In this case, MOAS conflict happens since NTT America will see two
origins AS7018 and AS16473 for prefix 141.225/16. This case is valid in practice
since there is no malicious behavior involved. However, it would be terrible that
BGP may be hijacked by malicious users from a different origin AS, and it also would
result in MOAS behavior. For example, as seen in Figure 2, UM was running BGP
protocol with other ASes and announced the 141.225/16 to NTT America; Meanwhile,
a malicious user hijacked the UT with AS3541, and announced the prefix 141.225/16
to NTT America as well through its ISP, then NTT America will see two origin ASes
for prefix 141.225/16, this kind of practices, such as misconfiguration and hijacking,
3
Figure 2: Invalid MOAS scenario
are invalid.
3 Related Work
The study most relevant to this work was conducted by Zhao et al. in 2001 [20].
They analyzed BGP MOAS conflicts from 11/08/1997 to 7/18/2001 and presented
several metrics of the observed MOAS conflicts. They also classified the MOAS
conflicts into three categories using relationships between the two AS paths in a
conflict. Finally, they pointed out a number of possible causes of the MOAS conflicts,
such as exchange point prefixes, anycast service, multi-homing without BGP or with
private AS number, and misconfiguration. However, they did not further identify the
contribution of each cause in their data.
Chin et al. [3] repeated the study in [20] using more recent data, and updated the
statistics of MOAS conflicts that lasted for a very short time period. They extended
some analysis on different countries in terms of origin ASes. They also observed that
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a great number of short-lived prefixes exist, but did not identify their causes.
Mahajan et al. [10] studied two types of mis-configurations – Origin Misconfigura-
tion and Export Misconfiguration for BGP route announcement. They mainly focused
on studying very short-lived prefixes less than one day. Note that mis-configurations
may or may not cause MOAS conflicts. In our work, we study MOAS conflicts caused
by various legitimate practices, mis-configurations, and attacks.
Geoff Huston’s BGP Table Statistics website [7] provides a list of MOAS prefixes
with their multiple origins and organization names. Hurricane Electric’s website [6]
provides the Multi Origin Route Report. Team Cymru’s website [17] maintains a
list of BGP inconsistent Origin ASNs and the corresponding prefixes with diagrams
updated every two hours. They provide valuable information about the daily MOAS
count and those ISPs involved. However, there is no comprehensive analysis what
caused the MOAS and the contribution for each cause.
In Zhao et al. [21], they presented an approach to detect false route announcement
resulting from invalid AS origination. They demonstrated that their approach can
substantially mitigate the negative impact caused by invalid MOAS through simula-
tion.
In another work Pei et al. [14] presented several causes of MOAS behavior, and
one of them, a prefix temporarily multi-homed to both the old provider and a new
provider, is the origin-AS transition considered in our paper.
4 Data Sources and Preprocessing
All of our results are based on the BGP data collected by the Routeviews project [12]
that has been widely used for studying the global routing system. We use BGP RIBs
and updates archived on 1,461 days between 01/01/2007 and 12/31/2010 from six
collectors with a total of 193 peer routers. The detailed peer information for the six
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collectors is shown in Table 1. From the table, we can see that the number of peer
ASes for the six collectors ranges from 1 at kixp to 46 at roueview2.
BGP RIB tables are archived periodically at each collector every day. However,
different collectors may use different archiving intervals and their clocks may slowly
drift apart. In order to obtain the overall view of the global routing table, we need to
aggregate BGP tables archived at the same time instance by the various collectors.
Therefore, for each collector on each day, we downloaded one archived BGP table
that is closest in time to midnight UTC and applied archived BGP updates to the
downloaded table to produce the midnight table. We then aggregated the midnight
tables from various collectors into one large table for each day. As a result, we obtained
1461 aggregated BGP tables. For example, for the rv2 collector on 9/1/2008, the BGP
table closest to midnight UTC was timestamped 11:10pm. We applied all the BGP
updates between 11:10pm on 9/1/2008 and 00:00am on 9/2/2008 to this BGP table to
obtain the table at 00:00am on 9/2/2008 using BGP update rules for announcements
and withdrawals.







rv2 U of Oregon, USA 46 68 1454
linx London, GB 29 59 1459
isc Palo Alto CA, USA 21 22 1461
eqix Ashburn, VA, USA 19 30 1461
wide Tokyo, Japan 10 13 1443
kixp Nairobi, Kenya 1 1 1298
all N/A 91 193 8576
We removed reserved address prefixes ( [16,8,15,2,1]) from our data before further
processing. These prefixes are not globally routable so they should not appear in the
DFZ (Default Free Zone). However, some of the routeviews peer routers were not
properly configured to filter these prefixes out in their peerings with the routeviews
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01/01/2007 222813 222811 790 789 223603 223600
12/31/2010 356777 356640 4103 4103 360880 360743
2007-2010 713704 713306 6530 6529 720234 719835
collectors. This is likely a measurement artifact since the routers may be correctly
configured with their operational peers, so we decided to remove the reserved prefixes.
Table 2 shows the number of IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes before and after this cleaning
procedure. There were a total of 720,234 prefixes before the cleaning and 719,835
prefixes left after the cleaning, i.e., 399 prefixes were removed all together during
the four years. We also removed Private AS numbers (AS64512-AS65535) for similar
reasons. Moreover, we removed AS23456 [18] from our data. This AS number is used
in place of a 32-bit AS number for backward compatibility, when a router with a
32-bit AS number advertises its routes to a router that does not recognize 32-bit AS
numbers. As such, AS23456 represents many different ASes. If we do not remove it,
then this particular AS will appear to originate many prefixes even though it does
not physically exist. Note that the removal of the above AS numbers has little effect
on our results as their presence in the data is very limited.
For the purpose of identifying MOAS causes, we utilized the IXP prefix list from
PCH [13] and a list of inferred anycast DNS addresses from the Internet Research
Lab at UCLA [19].
5 Terminology




MOAS prefix a prefix simultaneously originated by multiple ASes is called a
MOAS Prefix. The prefix is said to be involved in a MOAS conflict. Note that a
MOAS prefix may become a single-origin prefix from time to time.
New MOAS prefix on the first day when a prefix is simultaneously originated by
multiple ASes, it is called a New MOAS Prefix. The prefix may have never appeared
in the routing table previously or it may have existed as a single-origin prefix before
it becomes an MOAS prefix.
Disappearing MOAS prefix on the last day when a prefix is simultaneously
originated by multiple ASes, it is called a Disappearing MOAS Prefix. The prefix may
continue to appear in the routing tables as a single-origin prefix or it may completely
disappear from the routing table.
Prefix Appearing Days the total number of days when a prefix p appears in the
routing table. This metric does not include the days on which p is absent from the
routing table, e.g., when it is withdrawn by the origin AS(es).
MOAS Conflict Days the total number of days when a prefix p is simultaneously
originated by multiple ASes. This metric does not include the days on which p is a
single-origin AS.
(2) Example
Figure 3 shows when a particular prefix was originated by various ASes. It was
originated by AS1 from t0 to t5, AS2 from t1 to t2, and AS3 from t3 to t4. Therefore,
it was a MOAS prefix from t1 to t2 and from t3 to t4, and it was a single-origin prefix






t1 t2 t3 t4
Figure 3: Timeline of A MOAS Prefix with Three Origin ASes
prefix at t4. Its number of Prefix Appearing Days is (t5−t0) and its number of MOAS
Conflict Days is (t2 − t1) + (t4 − t3).
6 MOAS Characteristics
In this section, we present an overview of the characteristics exhibited by the MOAS
conflicts in our data.
(1) Number of MOAS Prefixes
We observed a total of 23,941 MOAS prefixes over the 4-year observation period,
including 23,817 IPv4 prefixes and 124 IPv6 prefixes. The daily count of MOAS
prefixes, however, is much smaller. As shown in Figure 4, the number of MOAS
prefixes on each day ranges from 1,259 (01/30/2007) to 3,750 (09/11/2010) with a
median of 1,905.
One can make a few more observations from Figure 4. First, there is an overall
increasing trend in the daily count of MOAS prefixes. More specifically, the daily
count gradually increased from ∼1,300 in Jan. 2007 to ∼2,300 in Dec. 2010 (there
is a slight decreased towards the end of 2010). Second, the daily count has a small
constant variation most of the time with a few large spikes.
In order to understand the variations in the observed MOAS count, we investigated
the new and disappearing MOAS prefixes (see Section 5 for their definitions). Figure 5






















Figure 4: Daily Count of MOAS Prefixes
a median of 10, while that of disappearing MOAS prefixes ranges from 0 to 1,381 with
a median of 9 (note that the y-axis in the top figure has a smaller range than that
in the bottom figure). The low median values in the new and disappearing MOAS
prefixes correspond to the small variations in the daily MOAS count. We believe
that these small changes are mainly due to the false origination of address prefixes,
which is usually short-lived and causes a small number of MOAS conflicts each day
(see Section (3) for in-depth analysis of this type of MOAS conflicts). On the other
hand, the large variations in the daily number of MOAS prefixes may have a different
cause. We found that the large increases are typically caused by an elevated number
of new MOAS prefixes over an extended period of time (from several days to several
months), while the decreases are much more precipitous, often occurring in one day.
This observation cannot be explained by false origination of address prefixes alone –
although mis-configurations or attacks could cause large spikes in MOAS conflicts,
these spikes tend to be very short-lived. After investigating four of the major spikes
during our study period, we concluded that the main cause of these spikes is likely the
simultaneous transition of many prefixes between their old and new origin ASes. Both










































New MOAS prefixes per day
Figure 5: Daily Count of New and Disappearing MOAS Prefixes
of MOAS conflicts. If the transition takes many days, we will observe a spike over
an extended period of time. Section (4) provides more supporting evidences for the
above conclusion.
(2) MOAS Conflict Duration
Figure 6 shows the cumulative distributions of MOAS conflict days (top curve) and
prefix appearing days (bottom curve) of the MOAS prefixes. From the bottom curve,
we can see that 27.5% of the MOAS prefixes have Prefix Appearing Days for 1461
days, i.e., these prefixes were in the global routing system over the entire 4-year
period. Ninety percent of the MOAS prefixes lasted more than 300 days, and only
0.3% lasted less than or equal than 15 days. These results suggest that most of
the MOAS prefixes are very stable. From the top curve, one can tell that 75%
of the MOAS prefixes experienced MOAS conflicts for less than 100 days and 50%
experienced conflicts for less than or equal to 15 days. This is in sharp contrast to
the bottom curve, which indicates that the majority of the MOAS conflicts did not



































































(b) Number of Days ≤ 15 days
Figure 7: Histograms of MOAS Conflict Days
We take a further look at the short-lived MOAS conflicts in Figure 7(a) and 7(b).
There are 19,231, 11,979, and 3,597 MOAS prefixes whose conflicts lasted less than
or equal to 150 days, 15 days and 1 day, respectively. They represent 80%, 50%, and
15% of all the MOAS prefixes, respectively. In Section 7, we will examine the causes
of these short-lived MOAS conflicts.
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Table 3: Distribution of MaxOrigin for MOAS Prefixes
MaxOrigin 2 3 4 5 6 7 >7
MOAS
Prefixes
23340 552 37 3 5 1 3
(3) Number of Origin ASes
We define MaxOrigin for an address prefix as the maximum number of ASes that
simultaneously originate the prefix. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of MaxO-
rigin. We highlight the following results: (a) three MOAS prefixes, 192.88.99.0/24,
2001::/32, and 2002::/16, have a MaxOrigin more than seven. They are anycast pre-
fixes used for IPv6-to-IPv4 relay service (Section (2) provides a more detailed analysis
of their characteristics); (b) there is one prefix, 206.223.115.0/24, with a MaxOrigin
of 7. This prefix belongs to Equinix (an Internet Exchange Point); and (c) 23,340
prefixes have a MaxOrigin of 2, which suggests that most MOAS conflicts involve
only two origins.
(4) Comparison with Previous Results
Table 4 compares the characteristics of the MOAS prefixes in our data set with those
in Zhao et al.’s work [20]. Our observation period was 1,461 days from 01/01/2007 to
12/31/2010. It is longer than Zhao’s observation period – 1,279 days from 11/08/1997
to 07/18/2001. We used 193 peer routers within 91 ASes from six global collectors,
while they used 54 peer routers within 43 ASes from one collector. One observation
is that our data has fewer MOAS conflicts (23,941 vs. 38,225) and a much lower
percentage of one-day MOAS conflicts (15% vs. 36%). However, 11,358 MOAS
conflicts in their study were due to one configuration fault, while there are no similar
events in our data. If we take this event into account, the numbers in the two studies
are much closer (23,941 vs. 26,867 and 15% vs. 9%). One can also observe that the
13
Table 4: Comparison with Previous Results
Metrics Previous Data Current Data
Observation period 1279 1461
Peer routers 54 193
Peer ASes 43 91
Median daily con-
flicts
683 (in 1998), 810.5
(in 1999), 951 (in
2000), 1294 (in 2001)
1362 (in 2007), 1589
(in 2008), 2019 (in
2009), 2346 (in 2010)
Expectation of con-
flict appearing days











Overall trend increase increase
1 The total number of MOAS conflicts after removing those caused
by a configuration fault
2 The percentage of one-day MOAS conflict after removing those
caused by a configuration fault
daily number of MOAS conflicts had an increasing trend in both their data and our
data. Moreover, the median number of daily MOAS conflicts is much higher in our
data. The above results suggest that there are more stable MOAS conflicts occurring
on a daily basis in the routing system today.
7 Identifying MOAS Causes
In this section, we examine five potential causes of MOAS conflicts, including Internet
Exchange Points, anycast, false origin AS, origin-AS transition, and multi-homing.
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(1) Internet Exchange Point Prefixes
Zhao et al. [20] speculated that one cause of MOAS conflicts is Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs), which provide Internet traffic exchange service between Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs). Because ISPs participating at an IXP typically share a common
address prefix allocated to the IXP, the IXP prefix could be originated by any of the
participating ISPs. However, we were surprised to learn from operators that IXP
prefixes are generally not announced to the global routing table [9]. In fact, some
IXPs have rules prohibiting the announcement of IXP address prefixes [9]. There is,
however, a common exception – an ISP may announce an IXP address prefix to its
customers for testing and diagnosis purposes. In this case, the prefix may be acciden-
tally leaked to the global routing table, if the ISP or its customers do not filter their
routing announcements properly; when multiple ISPs do so, there will be a MOAS
conflict.
We obtained a list of 370 IXP prefixes from the website of Packet Clearing House
(PCH) [13]. While this list may be incomplete for some countries (e.g., China), it is
the most comprehensive public data on IXP that we could find. Moreover, given the
total number of IXPs is inherently small, we consider this list as a good sample to
gauge the MOAS behavior of IXP prefixes.
IXP Prefixes in Global Routing Table
Our results are summarized in Table 5. After removing three private address prefixes,
we obtained 367 IXP prefixes (296 IPv4 and 71 IPv6) from the PCH website1. Among
these prefixes, we observed 137 prefixes (130 IPv4 and 7 IPv6) announced by the
RouteViews peers over the four-year data period. Moreover, 38 (37 IPv4 and 1 IPv6)
out of the 137 prefixes were involved in MOAS conflicts. In other words, only 10.3%
1It is very rare for IXPs to use private IP address space in RFC1918 [15], because it will break
traceroute and other diagnostic tools [9]. However, Maputo and Santiago de Compostela use the
private address space for their IXPs [13].
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of the studied IXP prefixes were involved in MOAS conflicts, and they represent only
0.16% of all the MOAS prefixes that we observed in our data. Finally, on the last
day of our data period, we observed only 53 IXP prefixes (48 IPv4 and 5 IPv6)
announced by the RouteViews peers, and 20 prefixes (19 IPv4 and 1 IPv6) were
involved in MOAS conflicts. In summary, announcement of IXP prefixes is not
a pervasive behavior and most likely is not a leading contributor to MOAS
conflicts.








IPv4 296 130 37 48 19
IPv6 71 7 1 5 1
All 367 137 38 53 20
Characteristics of MOAS IXP Prefixes
Figure 8 shows two cumulative distributions of the 38 IXP prefixes that were involved
in MOAS conflicts. The bottom curve is the cumulative distribution of the number
of days on which a prefix was announced by the RouteViews peers (Prefix Appearing
Days). One can find that (a) all the MOAS IXP prefixes appeared for more than 247
days; (b) more than 50% of them appeared for more than 1,000 days; and (c) nine
prefixes were present in the global routing tables all the time (1,461 days). These
results indicate that such prefixes tend to stay in the global routing table for months.
The top curve is the cumulative distribution of the number of days on which a prefix
is involved in MOAS conflicts (MOAS Conflict Days) (note that a MOAS prefix may
be originated by a single AS on some days). It shows that over 50% of the MOAS
IXP prefixes were involved in MOAS conflicts for more than 228 days. One prefix
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Figure 9: MaxOrigin Distribution of IXP Prefixes Involved in MOAS Conflicts
period. These results suggest that the MOAS behavior of IXP prefixes tends to be
long-lasting. Figure 9 shows the distribution of the MaxOrigin for the MOAS IXP
prefixes. We can see that (a) 20 of the 38 prefixes (52.6%) had two origin ASes; (b)
13 of the 38 prefixes (34.2%) had three origin ASes; and (c) one prefix (owned by
Equinix) had a MaxOrigin of seven.
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(2) Anycast Prefixes
Anycast is a technique to provide the same service in different physical locations
using a common IP address space. To provide the anycast service, one address prefix
is usually originated from multiple locations through BGP. As such, users obtain
their service from the servers that have the best paths determined by BGP. Since the
request load is distributed among multiple servers and users usually reach the closest
servers, the service has better performance, reliability, and security. Today, anycast
is commonly used for DNS, IPv4-to-IPv6 transition, and content delivery.
An anycast service can use a common AS number for all the locations, which
does not cause MOAS conflicts. In fact, one operator on the NANOG mailing list
remarked that “the overwhelming majority of anycast is done from homogeneous
origin AS” [22]. This claim, if true, would suggest that anycast is not a leading cause
of MOAS conflicts. While it is difficult to verify this claim, our results do provide
some support for it (see Section (2) on Anycast DNS Prefixes).
On the other hand, the deployment of anycast services can lead to MOAS conflicts
when each location originates the address prefix using a different origin AS number.
This practice makes it much easier to diagnose problems as network operators can
identify the specific AS that is providing service to their users. Therefore, McPherson
et al. recommend the use of unique origin AS number per node [11]. If this recom-
mendation becomes widely adopted, the number of MOAS conflicts due to anycast
will likely increase.
In the remainder of this section, we provide detailed analysis on the MOAS be-
havior of anycast prefixes that provide 6to4 relay and DNS services. It is part of our
future work to identify anycast prefixes that provide other types of services and study
their MOAS behavior.
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6to4 Relay Anycast Prefixes
RFC3068 specified three anycast prefixes that provide IPv6-to-IPv4 relay service:
192.88.99.0/24, 2001::/32 and 2002::/16 [5]. We summarize their statistics in Table 6.
Among the three prefixes, 192.88.99.0/24 has the most ASes originating it — it was
simultaneously originated by at least 6 ASes and at most 21 ASes, and it has a total
of 56 origin ASes. Being IPv6 prefixes, 2001::/32 and 2002::/16 have fewer origin
ASes in all three categories.







192.88.99.0/24 6 21 56
2001::/32 2 10 26
2002::/16 4 13 40
Anycast DNS Prefixes
DNS service is a natural candidate for anycast, especially for those root and gtld DNS
servers with extremely high load. Recently, Yu et al. used DNS query and traceroute
to infer DNS anycast addresses [19]. We obtained their list of 343 anycast DNS
addresses, which are distributed in 106 address prefixes. After matching these prefixes
with our MOAS data, we found that 20 of the 106 prefixes were involved in MOAS
conflicts (78 addresses are distributed in these 20 prefixes). In other words, only 18.9%
of these anycast DNS prefixes have MOAS behavior. This is one evidence supporting
the claim that most anycast services use homogeneous origin AS. Among the 20
































Figure 10: Persistence of Anycast DNS Prefixes Involved in MOAS Conflicts
(3) Suspected False Origin AS Prefixes
Previous studies ( [20, 3]) discovered a large number of short-lived MOAS conflicts
and found that many of them were caused by misconfigured BGP policies. However,
it remains a challenge to automatically distinguish false origin ASes from legitimate
ones. In this section, we propose a heuristic to identify false origin ASes in MOAS
conflicts. The false origins may be caused by mis-configurations or attacks, but we
do not attempt to infer the specific causes.
Heuristic
Routing policies on address prefix origination are usually long-term, so a legitimate
origin AS should last for months. When an AS falsely originates a prefix, it is likely
to withdraw the announcement after a short period of time, either to prevent the
potential consequences (in case of misconfigurations) or to avoid detection (in case of
attacks). Therefore, the duration of prefix origination by an AS can be one indicator
for identifying false origin ASes. However, we cannot use this indicator alone as we
may observe the same behavior with legitimate backup origin ASes. More specifically,
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when the primary origin AS for an address prefix fails, some ISPs may adopt the
backup origin AS while the others may still use the primary origin AS due to routing
convergence delay, leading to a MOAS conflict. When the primary origin AS recovers,
the backup origin AS disappears, not due to withdrawal of the backup origin AS, but
due to BGP’s best path selection. In this case, we also observe a MOAS conflict and
the quick disappearance of one of the origins. Fortunately, the two types of MOAS
conflicts have slightly different behavior: a false origin AS usually appears only once,
while a backup origin AS may appear from time to time, albeit for a short amount
of time during each episode. We use this observation to differentiate them.
We label an origin AS as a suspected false origin for an address prefix if it satisfies
three requirements: (a) the origin AS appeared on consecutive days, i.e., not intermit-
tently. This rule is used to differentiate false origins from legitimate backup origins;
(b) the origin AS appeared for a short period no more than a predefined number of
days. After some experimentation, we decided to use seven days as the threshold (see
Section (3)); and (c) the prefix had at least one other origin AS appearing earlier
than this origin AS, as well as one appearing later than this origin AS.
Results
We found that 2,573 MOAS prefixes have one or more suspected false origin ASes
and 2,239 MOAS prefixes become single-origin prefixes after removing the false origins
(i.e., their MOAS behavior is solely caused by the false origins). Figure 11 shows the
number of MOAS prefixes with suspected false origins on each day. This daily count
ranges between 0 and 64 with a median of 2. These results suggest that false origin
ASes were not a major cause of the MOAS conflicts in our data set. However, Table 7
shows that a considerable percentage of the short-lived MOAS conflicts were caused
by them. For example, 39.9% of the one-day MOAS conflicts involved the false origin





















Figure 11: Daily Count of MOAS Prefixes with Suspected False Origin ASes
Table 7: Percentage of MOAS Prefixes with Suspected False Origin ASes
Days 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Total pre-
fixes
3597 1325 1139 1240 631 722 599
False-origin
prefixes
1435 351 255 170 117 106 147
Percentage 39.9 26.5 22.4 13.7 18.5 14.7 24.5
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Note that due to the limitation of our methodology, we may miss those MOAS
conflicts that appeared between consecutive midnight BGP snapshots and these short-
lived MOAS conflicts are likely to be caused by false origins.
Validation
It is extremely challenging to validate the above results on false origin ASes due to
the following reasons. First, our results involve a large number of ISPs. Second, ISP
contact information in whois databases may be out of date. Third, operators may
be reluctant to share sensitive information. Nevertheless, we are currently working
on an automatic tool to obtain validation information from network operators for
each suspected false origin, and we expect to get some preliminary data in the near
future. Meanwhile, we used BGP routing tables from January 2011 to April 2011
to indirectly verify our results. More specifically, we checked if each suspected false
origin AS reappeared in the new data. If an origin AS did reappear, it most likely is
not a false origin and we call it a false positive. We did not find any false positives in
our results. Although this is not a direct validation, it does strengthen our confidence
in the results. We also used the new data to experiment with different time threshold
for our heuristic, and found that any time threshold less than eight days has zero
false positives. Therefore, seven days appears to be an appropriate time threshold for
our heuristic method.
(4) Origin-AS Transition
An organization may decide to switch the origin AS of its address prefix from one
to another. In order to maintain connectivity during the transition period, both the
old and new origin AS may announce the same prefix for a period of time. We call




To detect Transition-Period MOAS conflicts, we identify prefixes with two origin
ASes that partially overlapped for a period of time. Moreover, the first origin should
appear before the second one appeared and disappear before the second one disap-
peared. Furthermore, the first origin should not reappear later in the study period.
Finally, the overlapping period should be short to filter out multi-homing cases. We
chose 90 days as our threshold after some experimentation. For example, the prefix
8.22.224.0/21 was announced by AS47088 from 7/15/2009 to 9/19/2009, and then
the origin switched to AS3361 from 9/19/2009 to 12/31/2010. This prefix satisfies all
of our requirements, so our algorithm will consider its two origin ASes to be involved
in a Transition-Period MOAS Conflict. In this example, the transition period is only
one day (9/19/2009).
Results
We identified a total of 7,807 transition-period prefixes using our heuristic. Fur-
thermore, we used BGP data from Jan. 2011 to Apr. 2011 to verify our results.
If the old origin AS of an identified prefix reappeared in 2011, it is likely that the
previous behavior was not origin-AS transition. We found the old origin ASes of 52
prefixes reappearing in 2011, which represent only 0.67% of the identified prefixes.
This indicates that our heuristic is relatively robust.
Figure 12 shows the cumulative distribution of the duration of those transition-
period conflicts that lasted no more than 90 days. 60% of transition-period conflicts
lasted less than 10 days, 80% of them lasted less than 30 days, and 95% of them
lasted less than 60 days. In other words, the transition period is typically no more
than a few weeks.
Figure 13 shows the comparison between the daily count of overall MOAS conflicts

















































Number of MOAS from Transition
Number of Total MOAS
Figure 13: Comparison of Numbers of MOAS Conflicts
ranges from 0 to 1,220 with a median of 259. One interesting observation is that
the large spikes in this figure correspond in time to the spikes in the daily count of
overall MOAS prefixes. Figure 14 further shows that the Transition-Period MOAS
prefixes typically constitute less than 5% of the overall MOAS prefixes, but this
number reached 35% during those spikes. However, these two figures cannot yet
lead to the conclusion that the increases during the spikes were mainly caused by
the transition-period prefixes. Therefore, we investigated the new MOAS conflicts for
each spike period. Figure 15 shows the percentage of the new transition-period MOAS
conflicts over the total number of new MOAS conflicts for the four spike periods,
10/13/2007-11/8/2007, 2/11/2008-3/16/2008, 6/21/2008-7/1/2008 and 7/30/2010-
9/11/2010. From the figures, we can see that the new transition-period conflicts
































Figure 14: Percentage of Transition-Period MOAS Conflicts
than 50%. Thus we can conclude that the origin-AS transition was the leading cause
of the four sudden increases of MOAS daily conflicts.
(5) Multi-homing
After removing all the suspected false origins and those origins involved in transition-
period MOAS conflicts, we have a total of 13,924 MOAS prefixes remaining, including
13,851 IPv4 prefixes and 73 IPv6 prefixes. Since our study of IXP and anycast prefixes
led to the conclusion that they most likely are not major causes of MOAS conflicts,
we suspect that the majority of the remaining MOAS prefixes are caused by multi-
homing. When an organization has multiple providers, its address prefix may be
originated by the providers if the organization does not own an AS number or it does
not support BGP routing. This type of MOAS conflicts should be long-lasting, but
we do not have a reliable method to distinguish them from those caused by anycast.
It remains our future work to identify MOAS conflicts caused by multi-homing.
8 Conclusion
MOAS conflicts result from both valid and invalid causes, and this fact poses chal-




































































































































(d) Fourth Spike (7/30/2010-
9/11/2010)
Figure 15: Percentage of New Transition-Period MOAS Conflicts
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causes is to understand the BGP operational behavior. The analysis would help op-
erators to view how BGP protocol performs and what really happened in the Internet
for different services, such as IXP, Anycast and so forth. We study the invalid causes
for the purpose of detecting malicious behaviors caused by BGP protocol deficiency,
such as misconfiguration and hijacking. Moreover, sometimes we have to combine the
two kinds of causes together to figure out the solution of a MOAS problem.
In this paper, we studied MOAS conflicts using four years of BGP data from Jan.
2007 to Dec. 2010. Compared with ten years ago, there are more stable MOAS con-
flicts each day, indicating that more organizations have adopted practices that lead
to legitimate MOAS conflicts. We also found that the overall MOAS conflicts per day
still has an increasing trend towards the end of our data. Moreover, we found that
origin-AS transition, rather than false origin ASes, may be a major cause of the spikes
in the observed daily MOAS conflicts. Furthermore, our analysis supports the conjec-
ture that IXP and anycast are not major contributors to MOAS conflicts. Finally, we
developed two heuristics to detect false origin ASes and origin-AS transitions. The
summarized results are demonstrated in table 8.
Table 8: The Summarized Results of MOAS causes









Number 38 23 2,573 7,807 13,924
To categorize specific MOAS prefixes into different classes is extremely challenging
and our approaches have limitations. We have not found a very efficient way to detect
anycast prefixes. We were using telnet service to login a few globally distributed
Looking Glass Servers-BGP route Servers and issue traceroute commands to those
anycast-like prefixes. However, this approach required the participation of each IP
address for those prefixes, and thus it was slow and time-consuming. Moreover, the
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inference results in the paper just had a preliminary verification and justification
based on the data year 2011. They have not been verified by the ground truth from
the operators. Therefore, most of time we underestimate the number of prefixes for
each category.
The future work includes the following: (1) design a new heuristic method to
identify MOAS conflicts caused by multi-homing; (2) validate these results using
operator feedback; and (3) use these findings and heuristics to design mechanisms to
detect illegitimate MOAS conflicts in real-time.
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